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A B S T R A C T
The UK Quality and Outcomes Framework rewards general practices for achieving quality indicators for chronic
disease management. Some indicators are multi-rewarded. For example, there are indicators for controlling
blood pressure for patients with diabetes and for patients with chronic heart disease. Thus if a patient has
diabetes and heart disease the practice is rewarded twice for controlling her blood pressure. Other indicators are
singly rewarded: the incentivised activity is only for patients with single specific condition. We compare general
practice performance on single and multi-reward indicators. We use a 2005/6–2012/13 panel of over 800
Scottish general practices, control for practice characteristics, practice fixed effects, indicator characteristics
(whether the indicator was for measurement, treatment, or intermediate outcome, maximum payment, upper
thresholds), condition, and year and cluster on indicators. We find that the proportion of patients with a given
condition for whom a quality indicator was achieved was higher, and the proportion who were exception re-
ported was lower, for multi-reward indicators than for single reward indicators. We also exploit the replacement
of multi-reward smoking indicators by single reward indicators in 2006/7. Compared to indicators which were
always single or always multi-reward, the proportion of the relevant patients for whom the smoking indicators
were achieved fell when the smoking indicators were no longer multi-reward. Fine details of pay for perfor-
mance schemes matter: they affect physician behaviour and patient outcomes.
1. Introduction
Pay for performance (P4P) schemes linking health care provider
financial rewards to quality have been introduced in many healthcare
systems. These include Australia (Scott, 2007), Canada (Pink et al.,
2006), Germany (Greb et al., 2006), the Netherlands (Custers et al.,
2006), New Zealand (Perkins and Seddon, 2006), Spain (Gené-Badia
et al., 2007), the UK (Meacock et al., 2014), and the US (Rosenthal
et al., 2006). They have had mixed success (Guthrie and Tang, 2016;
Gillam et al., 2012; Scott et al., 2011; Van Herck et al., 2010; Greene
and Nash, 2009; Christianson et al., 2007; Petersen et al., 2006; Town
et al., 2005; Armour et al., 2001). Both standard and behavioural
economic models suggest that the design of P4P schemes matters in the
sense that it will change the behaviour of those incentivised, not just the
rewards they receive (Eijkenaar et al., 2013; Kristensen et al., 2013;
Mehrotra et al., 2010). Thus the success of the Advancing Quality
scheme in England (Sutton et al., 2012) but its failure in the US (Ryan,
2009) has been attributed to differences in coverage and the magnitude
of rewards on offer (Epstein, 2012). In this paper we investigate if
implicit incentives created by rather more subtle features of a major UK
P4P scheme affected the behaviour of health care providers and the
outcome for patients.
We use data from the UK Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF)
to investigate whether and how General Practitioners (GPs) in Scotland
responded to the implicit financial incentives created by the fine details
of the scheme. The QOF rewards general practices for achievements on
a large number of quality indicators for management of chronic con-
ditions and creates complex multi-tasking incentives (Holmstrom and
Milgrom, 1991). Some groups of indicators produce multiple rewards
for the same activity. For example, there are indicators for controlling
blood pressure for patients with diabetes and for patients with chronic
heart disease (CHD). Thus if a patient has both conditions the practice is
rewarded twice for controlling the patient's blood pressure. Other in-
dicators are single reward: the incentivised activity only counts towards
for one indicator. For example, the indicator for retinal screening ap-
plies only to diabetic patients. We compare general practice perfor-
mance and quality for single reward and multi-reward indicators and
find that, controlling for other features of the indicators and for practice
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characteristics, practices have greater achievement on multi-reward
indicators. We also exploit the replacement of six separate multi-reward
smoking indicators for patients with six conditions with a single reward
indicator for patients with any of the six conditions. We compare the
changes in practice achievement for these indicators with changes for
indicators which were always single or always multi-reward and find
that the change from multiple to single rewards for an activity wor-
sened practice performance.
Our paper contributes to the empirical literature on how physician
agents, who are likely to be both intrinsically and extrinsically moti-
vated (McGuire, 2000; Rebitzer and Taylor, 2011), behave under multi-
task P4P schemes. Our results reinforce the argument that, whether we
view the design of incentive schemes as engineering (Roth, 2002) or
plumbing (Duflo, 2017), fine details matter: they affect the behaviour of
incentivised providers and hence outcomes for patients.
2. Background
2.1. NHS primary care
Patients face no charges in the National Health Service (NHS) which
is funded almost entirely out of general taxation. Patients register with
a general practice which also acts as the gatekeeper for non-emergency
hospital care. On average, general practices have around 5800 patients
and 5 GPs and most are partnerships owned by their GPs.
Around 82% of Scottish practices have a General Medical Services
(GMS) contract with the NHS under which they are paid by a mixture of
capitation, quality incentives, and items of service. Capitation accounts
for about 60% of practice revenue and varies with the demographic and
morbidity mix of the practice (ISD Scotland, 2016a). Around 11% of
revenue is from the QOF and increases with practice list size for given
quality. Practice payments for providing specific services including
vaccinating and screening target proportions of the relevant practice
population also increase with list size. Practices are reimbursed for the
costs of their premises but have to fund all other expenses, such as
hiring practice nurses and clerical staff, from their revenue. The other
18% of practices have contracts which are similar to the GMS contract
but they are also rewarded for providing additional services for specific
patient groups.
2.2. Quality and Outcomes Framework
The QOF was introduced in April 2004. Although participation was
voluntary almost all general practices in Scotland took part. The QOF
linked payment to indicators for activities intended to improve the
management of patients with chronic conditions. We focus on the
clinical quality indicators which were measured as the ratio of patients
for whom an indicator was achieved to the number of patients declared
eligible for the indicator. For example, indicator CHD6 was the pro-
portion of eligible patients with Chronic Heart Disease (CHD) whose
blood pressure was 150/90 or less. Practices were awarded points
which increased linearly with achievement between a lower threshold
(40% for most indicators from 2006/7 onwards) and an upper threshold
(varying between 50% and 90% across indicators and years). The upper
thresholds for the clinical indicators were set at less than 100% to allow
for patients for whom the indicator could not be achieved but for whom
there was no appropriate exception reporting code (Coulson, 2011).
Practices were paid a price per point (on average around £125) which
varied with the practice list size and the number of patients with the
relevant condition. Initially (2005/6 in our data) there were 65 ratio
clinical indicators (out of a total of 146 indicators) covering 11 con-
ditions and accounting for 47% of the total points available. There were
subsequent changes to the number of indictors, indicator definitions,
the conditions covered, upper and lower thresholds, and the maximum
points available for an indicator. In 2012/13, there were 76 ratio
clinical indicators for 22 conditions potentially accounting for 59% of
total points.
Some ratio clinical indicators are for activities which are specific to
patients with a particular condition. For example, in 2011/12 the in-
dicator DM21 was the percentage of patients with diabetes who had a
record of retinal screening in the previous 15 months. Similarly, CHD10
was the percentage of patients with CHD being treated with a beta
blocker. With these single reward indicators the incentivised activity
(record of retinal screening, prescribing beta blocker) counted for
achievement only on one indicator and was thus rewarded only once
even for a multi-morbid patient with both diabetes and CHD.
Other activities count for more than one indicator. For example in
2010/11, there were indicators for the percentage of patients with
coronary heart disease (CHD8) and the percentage of patients with
diabetes (DM17) whose total cholesterol was 5mmol/l or less. CHD8
and DM17 are examples of multi-reward indicators where an activity
(achieving a cholesterol target) for a multi-morbid patient with both
CHD and diabetes counts for achievement on more than one indicator
and thus is rewarded more than once.
3. Methods
3.1. Incentives under the QOF
The number of points, and hence revenue, earned on a ratio clinical
indicator is determined by reported achievement N/(P−E), where N is
the number of patients for whom the indicator is achieved, P the
number with the relevant condition, and E the number with the con-
dition who are exception reported by the practice. P–E is the number
declared eligible by the practice for the indicator. Patients can be ex-
ception reported on clinical grounds (for example they are allergic to
the treatment, or terminally ill, or very frail) or because they have re-
fused to attend, or because the relevant investigative or secondary care
service is not available. Thus a practice can increase reported
achievement by increasing N and E.
We investigate whether an indicator being single or multi-reward
affects practice behaviour as measured by population achievement (N/P),
exception reporting (E/P), and reported achievement (N/(P−E)). We in-
terpret population achievement (N/P) as a measure of quality of care
because, unlike reported achievement, it is not affected by exception
reporting (Doran et al., 2006).
If an activity, say recording blood pressure, is incentivised by in-
dicators for more than one condition (say CHD and diabetes), then a
practice will earn more revenue from recording blood pressure for a
patient with both CHD and diabetes than for a patient with only CHD or
only diabetes. Other things equal, this incentive will imply that a higher
proportion of multimorbid patients will have blood pressure recorded
than patients with only CHD or diabetes. This in turn will imply, other
things equal, that population achievement (N/P) for the multi-reward
indicators for recording blood pressure for patients with CHD and for
patients with diabetes will be greater than population achievement for
single reward indicators.
However, not all other things are equal when comparing achieve-
ment on different indicators. Marginal revenue from increasing
achievement on an indicator depends on the maximum number of
points available for the indicator, the upper threshold beyond which
greater achievement has no effect on points and revenue, and the
number of practice patients with the relevant condition. The marginal
cost of achieving an indicator may differ across indicators because they
apply to patients with different conditions and different levels of multi-
morbidity. The cost of achieving an indicator may vary with patient age
and socio-economic characteristics. Costs will vary with the type of
incentivised activity. For example, recording blood pressure is easier
than controlling it. And finally there may also be differences in cost and
revenue functions and GP preferences across practices.
In our empirical modelling we control for indicator points and
thresholds, as well as practice, and patient mix characteristics and so
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we expect that population achievement N/P will be greater for multi
reward indicators than for single reward indicators.
Exception reporting more patients for an indicator will also increase
reported achievement N/(P−E) and so the marginal revenue from
gaming exception reporting will be greater for multi reward indicators
than for single reward indicators. But GPs are intrinsically as well as
extrinsically motivated (McGuire, 2000; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006).
Increasing population achievement (N/P) on a quality indicator bene-
fits patients whereas gaming exception reporting and thereby in-
creasing E/P does not and offends against professional norms. Thus E/P
may not be higher for multi-reward indicators. Indeed, if the incentives
from multiple rewards lead the practice to choose a high enough N to
take reported achievement (N/(P–E)) above the upper threshold for the
indicator, then the practice could reduce gaming of E without financial
penalty. Being multi rewarded could increase or reduce or have no
effect on E/P.
3.2. Estimation: panel models
Using data from eight years (2005/6–2012/13) we estimate models
to examine if practice performance on an indicator depends on whether
the indicator activity is multi or single reward:
= + + + + + + +=y M D rx x Digt M it itQ Q c ic cgt rc gtp p t T T g igt0 122
(1)
We use three measures of performance (yigt): population achievement
Nigt/Pigt, exception reporting Eigt/Pigt, and reported achievement Nigt/
(Pigt−Eigt).
Mit is the extent to which the indicator is multi-reward. We use three
measures of multi-reward, each entered in separate regressions. The
simplest is a 1/0 dummy for the indicator being multi-reward. The
other two allow for the possibility that the effect of being multi-reward
depends on the number of other indicators (0–5) which can be re-
warded for the same activity to the same patient. We include this as a
continuous variable and, more flexibly, as a set of five indicator for 1, 2,
…, 5 other indicators rewarded for the same activity.
xitQ is a vector of characteristics of indicator i in year t (which might
affect the revenue from an indicator, or the effort required to achieve it,
or the gain to patients from achieving the indicator): the maximum
number of points for the indicator; the upper threshold; dummies for
indicator type (treatment indicators, such as prescribing beta blockers
for CHD patients, intermediate outcome indicators, such as blood
pressure 140/80 or less for diabetes patients, versus the baseline cate-
gory of record indicator, such as measuring blood pressure); and 21
dummies for the condition targeted by the indicator i (diabetes is the
baseline condition). We also include the prevalence rate rcgt (percentage
of patients in practice g at time t with condition c) for the condition for
which the indicator is a quality measure. This allows for the number of
patients with a condition to affect costs and for the fact that, until
2009/10 the marginal financial reward for achieving an indicator
varied with the number of patients with the relevant condition (Guthrie
et al., 2006; Gravelle et al., 2010).
xgtp is a vector of practice characteristics including numbers of GPs,
proportion of female GPs, list size, patient age and gender mix, dum-
mies for rurality, and whether the practice can dispense as well as
prescribe medicines. It also includes the percentage of the practice's
patients who live in datazones (small areas with 500–1000) which are
in the top 15% of the distribution of the Scottish Index of Multiple
Deprivation (Scottish Government, 2018). DtT is a vector of year dum-
mies, αg is a practice fixed effect, and εigt is a zero mean error term.
Whether an indicator is a multi-reward or single-reward is a char-
acteristic of the indicator, not the practice. Since different practices’
performances on a given indicator may be correlated because of un-
observed indicator characteristics which affect the ease or difficulty of
the incentivised activity we cluster the errors on the indicator
(Moulton, 1986).
We believe that the specification (1) enables us to identify the effect
of an indicator being multi or single rewarded because it allows for
characteristics of indicators (maximum points, upper threshold, whe-
ther they are for recording, treatment or intermediate outcomes, the
type of condition, and the prevalence of the condition) which may af-
fect performance and which might differ systematically between multi
and single reward indicators. In particular, the two specifications with
the number of other indicators rewarded for the same activity as the
multi-reward measure are persuasive tests of the effect of multi versus
single reward.
3.3. Estimation: difference in differences models
The panel pooled model uses a rich set of covariates and a large
number of indicators over eight years. But the specification cannot
allow for unobserved characteristics of indicators, such as GPs’ per-
ceptions of their effects on patient health, which might affect perfor-
mance and might differ between multi and single reward indicators. We
can however exploit the replacement of two sets of multi-reward
smoking indicators with two single reward indicators for the same ac-
tivities in 2006/7. We estimate difference in differences (DID) models
of the effect of an activity switching from being multi to single reward.
As controls we use indicators of the same activity type (recording,
treatment) which were always multi-reward or always single reward
before and after the change to the smoking indicators.
In 2005/6 there were six multi-reward indicators for recording
smoking status for patients with asthma (aged 20 or more), high blood
pressure, CHD, COPD, diabetes, and stroke. In 2006/7 and 2007/8
these six indicators were replaced by a single reward indicator
(SMOKING1) for recording the smoking status of a patient with any, or
any combination of the six conditions. Similarly, six multi-reward in-
dicators for offering advice on stopping smoking to smokers with the six
conditions were replaced by a single reward indicator (SMOKING2) for
smoking cessation advice for patients who smoke and have one or more
of the six conditions. We cannot extend the DID analysis to later years
because in 2008/9 two further conditions were added to the six covered
by the single reward smoking indicators and there was no corre-
sponding single reward indicator in previous years for the two addi-
tional conditions. Appendix A1 has further details on the smoking in-
dicators.
We measure practice population achievement in recording smoking
in 2005/6 as the total number over the six indicators for whom smoking
status was recorded divided by the total number with the six conditions.
For reported achievement the denominator is the total number with the
conditions minus the total exception reported. For exception reporting
the numerator is the total exception reported over the six conditions.
For 2006/7 and 2007/8 we measure the recording of smoking status for
these patients as the achievement on the replacement single reward
record indicator SMOKING1. Thus we regard recording of smoking
status as one indicator for which multiple rewards were removed in
2006/7–2007/8. We proceed similarly for the smoking cessation advice
indicators.
To test for the effect of replacing multi-reward smoking indicators
with a single reward indicator we estimate
= + + + + + + ++ + + + ++ +
y D D S A S D S D A D
A D S r D S rx x (1 )
igt t t i i i t i t i t
i t it
Q Q
gt
p p
i c
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c
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rcs
cgt
g igt
0 1
1
2
2
3 4 1
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
(2)
where D D,t t1 2 are dummy variables for 2006/7 and 2007/8. Si is a
dummy variable for the smoking indicator, and Ai is a dummy variable
for indicators which were single reward in all three years 2005/
6–2007/8. The baseline indicator type is indicators which were multi-
reward in all three years.
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The always single reward and always multi-reward control groups
are sets of indicators for the same type of activity as the smoking in-
dicator: recording indicators were the control group for SMOKING1
(recording smoking status) and treatment indicators were the control
group for SMOKING2 (smoking cessation advice).
The time invariant unobserved idiosyncratic characteristics of in-
dicators which affect outcomes via will be picked up in β0 (for always
multi-reward indicators), β3 (for the smoking indicator) and β4 (for
always single reward indicators). xitQ is a vector of two indicator char-
acteristics (maximum points, upper threshold). For the smoking record
(cessation advice) indicator we use the total maximum points on the six
smoking record (cessation advice) indicators and the national indicator
prevalence weighted mean values of the upper thresholds of the six
smoking record (cessation advice) indicators for 2005/6 and the values
for SMOKING1 (SMOKING2) in 2006/7 and 2007/8. xgtp is a vector of
practice characteristics. rcgt is the practice condition prevalence rate for
the condition covered by the indicator. The specification allows the
effect of say diabetes prevalence to vary depending on whether the
indicator is a control group indicator or a smoking indicator.
δ1 is the 2006/7–2005/6 DID: the change in performance from
2005/6 to 2006/7 for the smoking indicator for recording (cessation
advice) relative to the change in a control group of always multi-reward
record (treatment) indicators. δ2 is the 2007/8–2005/6 DID relative to
always multi-reward indicators. δt− γt (t=1,2) are the analogous DIDs
for the smoking indicator relative to control groups of always single
indicators.
The DID models identify the effect of a change from multi to single
reward only if the smoking and control indicators would otherwise have
had parallel trends in the absence of the change in QOF incentives.
Comparison of the change in smoking and control indicators between
2004/5 and 2005/6 would not be useful because 2004/5 was the first
year of the QOF when practices were still learning the system and the
price per QOF point increased from £75 to £125 in 2005/6. Instead we
estimate two DIDs: the first comparing the 2006/7–2005/6 change in
the smoking indicator with the 2006/7–2005/6 change in the control
indicators (δ1 or δ1− γ1 depending on whether the controls are always
multi reward or always single reward). The second DID compares the
2007/8–2005/6 change in the smoking indicator with the 2007/
8–2005/6 change in the controls (δ2 or δ2− γ2). If there was an un-
derlying downward trend in the smoking indicators then the 2007/
8–2005/6 DID will be more negative than the 2006/7–2005/6 DID:< 02 1 or <( ) ( )2 2 1 1 . We test for an underlying trend by
comparing these DIDs.
3.4. Data
We use practice level QOF data extracted by the Information
Services Division (ISD) from Scottish general practice electronic patient
records for eight financial years (2005/6 to 2012/13) and GP practice
information from the ISD General Practitioner Contractor Database (ISD
Scotland, 2016b). We do not use data for the first transitional year of
the QOF in 2004/5. In 2004/5 practices may have been unfamiliar with
the complexities of a new incentive scheme with 146 quality indicators.
In 2004/5 the average price per QOF was £75 and was increased to
£125 in subsequent years. The total number of points achieved by
practices between 2004/5 and 2005/6 increased by 6%, the largest
change by far between 2004/5 and 2016/17. There is also no in-
formation on exception reporting for 2004/5. There were other major
changes to the GP contract in 2004/5 including the introduction of a
new capitation formula which led to marked changes in the total
practice revenue.
We drop practices with non-GMS contracts (10.8% of the initial
513,629 observations) because they were rewarded differently for QOF
achievement and paid directly for some activities counting towards
QOF indicators. We also drop practices with fewer than 1000 patients
(2.2% of the initial sample) because they may be in the process of
opening or closing. ISD does not report numbers of patients for whom
an indicator was achieved, the number declared eligible for the in-
dicator, and number with the condition, if these are less than five pa-
tients. We drop these observations (5.5% of the initial sample). Two
practice year observations with reported prevalence for a condition
greater than the list size were also dropped. The final data set is an
unbalanced panel of 815–857 practices with 418,720 practice-year-in-
dicator observations. Details of the multi-reward indicators between
2005/6 and 2012/13 are in Appendix A2.
Ethical approval is not required for this study. All data used in this
study is publicly available. No data was directly collected from human
subjects.
4. Results
Table 1 has summary statistics on the characteristic and outcomes of
single and multi-reward indicators. Multi-reward indicators were less
likely to be for recording patient characteristics than single reward
indicators. Multi-reward and single reward indicators had similar upper
thresholds and maximum points. On average, multi-reward activities
had higher population achievement rates and lower exception rates
than single reward indicators. Reported achievement varies positively
with population achievement and negatively with exception reporting.
The higher population achievement of multi-reward indicators more
than offsets their lower exception rate, so that reported achievement
(N/(P−E) = (N/P)/(1−E/P)) is higher for multi-reward indicators.
Notice that for multi-reward indicators reported achievement (N/
(P−E)) is on average above the upper threshold beyond which increase
in N or E do not increase practice revenue. For single reward indicators
overall reported achievement is very close to the upper threshold. There
are three possible reasons for over achievement. First, some indicators
may apply only to a small number of patients. Thus a practice with ten
patients eligible for an indicator with an upper threshold of 65% will
have to treat 7 of them (70% reported achievement) to get the max-
imum points. Second, to reduce the risk of losing points when treated
patients leave before the financial year end date at which reported
achievement is counted, practices may treat more than enough to
achieve the upper threshold. Third, GPs may also care about patient
health as well as income and so wish to achieve an indicator for patients
even when this has no effect on practice revenue from the QOF. The
strength of the first two of these motives is, other things equal, greater
for multi-reward indicators.
4.1. Panel models
Table 2 reports key results from the models for three outcome
measures (panels a to c) with three measures (columns (i) to (iii)) of the
extent to which an indicator was multi-reward (full results are in
Appendix A3).
In panel a population achievement (N/P) is higher for multi-reward
indicators (column (i)) and in columns (ii) and (iii) where population
achievement increases with the number of other indicators for which
the activity is rewarded. In panel b exception reporting (E/P) is smaller
for multi-reward indicators. In panel c reported achievement (N/(P−E))
is greater for multi-reward indicators and increases with the number of
other indicators rewarded for the same activity.
The coefficients on the covariates (Appendix A3) show that treat-
ment and outcome indicators have smaller reported achievement and
population achievement rates than record indicators and treatment
indicators have higher exception rates. The coefficient on maximum
available QOF points is statistically insignificant for all models. Re-
ported and population achievement are smaller in larger, rural (except
for very remote small towns), and dispensing practices. Practices with a
higher proportion of the young (less than 85 years old) have higher
reported achievement and population achievement. The exception rate
is higher in larger practices, those with a higher proportion of female
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Table 2
Practice QOF performance and multi-reward indicators 2005/6–2012/13.
Measure of multiple reward
(i) (ii) (iii)
Indicator is multi-reward Number other indicators rewarded for same activity Number other indicators rewarded for same activity
coef (SE) coef (SE) coef (SE)
a. Population achievement rate (N/P)
M dummy 0.0456*** (0.0123)
n other 0.0165*** (0.0037)
1 other 0.0297 (0.0158)
2 other 0.0440** (0.0146)
3 other 0.0131 (0.0166)
4 other 0.0762*** (0.0162)
5 other 0.0993*** (0.0159)
R2 0.3297 0.3354 0.3443
b. Exception rate (E/P)
M dummy −0.0263** (0.0098)
n other −0.0088** (0.0028)
1 other −0.0191 (0.0124)
2 other −0.0342** (0.0112)
3 other 0.0057 (0.0141)
4 other −0.0433*** (0.0121)
5 other −0.0604*** (0.0104)
R2 0.2152 0.2167 0.2294
c. Reported achievement (N/(P–E))
M dummy 0.0246*** (0.0062)
n other 0.0095*** (0.0020)
1 other 0.0133 (0.0085)
2 other 0.0151* (0.0075)
3 other 0.0226** (0.0068)
4 other 0.0410*** (0.0092)
5 other 0.0484*** (0.0108)
R2 0.2112 0.2155 0.2160
Notes. Specification (1) linear practice fixed effects, SEs clustered on indicators. R2: overall. Total indicator-year-practice observations: 418,720, 815 to 857 practices,
8 years. *: p < 0.05; **: p < 0.01; ***: p < 0.001.
Table 3
Smoking indicators 2005/6–2007/8.
Indicator Definition Max points Lower threshold Upper threshold Population achievement
(N/P)
Exception rate
(E/P)
Reported achievement
(N/(P–E))
2005/6
ASTHMA4 Record 6 25 70 0.9289 0.0251 0.9529
BP2 Record 10 25 90 0.9722 0.0121 0.9840
CHD3 Record 7 25 90 0.9586 0.0181 0.9763
COPD4 Record 6 25 90 0.9412 0.0321 0.9724
DM3 Record 3 25 90 0.9718 0.0148 0.9864
STROKE3 Record 3 25 90 0.9372 0.0309 0.9672
All smoking record indicators 0.9572 0.0181 0.9749
ASTHMA5 Cessation advice 6 25 70 0.8590 0.0524 0.9073
BP3 Cessation advice 10 25 90 0.9744 0.0074 0.9816
CHD4 Cessation advice 4 25 90 0.9285 0.0316 0.9589
COPD5 Cessation advice 6 25 90 0.9246 0.0385 0.9617
DM4 Cessation advice 5 25 90 0.9318 0.0334 0.9638
STROKE4 Cessation advice 2 25 70 0.8984 0.0421 0.9380
All smoking cessation advice indicators 0.9280 0.0293 0.9560
2006/7 and 2007/8
SMOKING1 Record 33 40 90 0.9587 0.0047 0.9632
SMOKING2 Cessation advice 35 40 90 0.9283 0.0097 0.9374
Notes. Record: % patients with record of smoking status in the previous 15 months, except those who have never smoked where smoking status need only be recorded
once since diagnosis. Cessation advice: % patients who smoke whose notes contain a record that smoking cessation advice or referral to a specialist service, where
available, has been offered within the previous 15 months. ASTHMA4, ASTHMA5: patients aged 20 and over. SMOKING1, SMOKING2 are for patients with any or
any combination of asthma (age 20 and above), hypertension, CHD, COPD, diabetes, stroke. Numerators and denominators are sums of numerators and denominators
over all practices with data.
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patients, a higher proportion of very old (85+), a higher proportion of
male GPs, in urban areas, and in less deprived areas.
Since the number of eligible patients is small in some cases we also
estimated negative binomial count data regressions as robustness
checks and obtained qualitatively and quantitatively similar results
(Appendix A4). Results were also robust (Appendix A5) to weighting by
average list size, to dropping 2005/6 as the there was a major change in
the QOF from 2006/7, and to using a balanced sample of practices. We
also estimated models with a balanced sample of practices and in-
dicators, obtaining the same pattern of results but with reduced sig-
nificance because of the loss of 75% of observations. Finally, we added
interactions of indicator type (treatment, intermediate, and outcome)
with the condition to which the indicator applied to further control for
differences in the effects of the indicator on patient health and practice
cost. Results were very similar to those in Table 2 with a slight increase
in the effect of multi-reward.
4.2. Difference in differences models
Table 3 has summary statistics for the smoking indicators. The total
points available for the 6 smoking record indicators in 2005/6 was 35
and for the single SMOKING1 record indicator in 2006/7–2007/8 it was
33. Total points available for smoking cessation advice was 33 in 2005/
6 and 35 in 2006/7–2007/8. Thus points for recording and cessation
Table 4
Difference in differences in mean performance.
Smoking indicator Control group of indicators DIDs (2006/7-07/08 vs 2005/6)
n obs Population
achievement
(N/P)
Exception rate
(E/P)
Reported
achievement
(N/(P–E))
n obs Population
achievement
(N/P)
Exception rate
(E/P)
Reported
achievement
(N/(P–E))
Population
achievement
(N/P)
Exception
rate (E/P)
Reported
achievement
(N/(P–E))
Smoking status record Single reward indicators Smoking status record
2005/6 646 0.9570 0.0187 0.9752 4214 0.8619 0.0581 0.9141 −0.0020 −0.0192*** −0.0209***
2006/7-07/08 1292 0.9571 0.0050 0.9619 8428 0.8640 0.0637 0.9218 (0.0055) (0.0030) (0.0040)
Smoking status record Multi reward indicators Smoking status record
2005/6 646 0.9570 0.0187 0.9752 4250 0.9352 0.0299 0.9639 −0.0040* −0.0146*** −0.0185***
2006/7-07/08 1292 0.9571 0.0050 0.9619 8500 0.9392 0.0309 0.9692 (0.0015) (0.0009) (0.0016)
Smoking cessation advice Single reward indicators Smoking cessation advice
2005/6 795 0.9291 0.0286 0.9564 2295 0.7502 0.1441 0.8726 −0.0176 −0.0208** −0.0396**
2006/7-07/08 1590 0.9282 0.0099 0.9375 4590 0.7669 0.1462 0.8934 (0.0084) (0.0032) (0.0068)
Smoking cessation advice Multi reward indicators Smoking cessation advice
2005/6 795 0.9291 0.0286 0.9564 10964 0.7812 0.1017 0.8709 −0.0124* −0.0265*** −0.0395***
2006/7-07/08 1590 0.9282 0.0099 0.9375 21928 0.7928 0.1096 0.8915 (0.0057) (0.0030) (0.0047)
Notes. n obs: number of observations. Control groups: for smoking status record: 7 record indicators which were single reward in 2005/6, 2006/7–2007/8, 7 record
indicators which were multi reward in 2005/6, 2006/7 and 2007/8; for smoking cessation advice: 3 treatment indicators which were single reward in 2005/6, 2006/
7–2007/8, 14 treatment indicators which were multi-reward in 2005/6, 2006/7–2007/8. DID: change in mean performance on smoking indicator minus change in
mean of performance on controls. SEs on DID coefficients are clustered on indicators. *: p < 0.05; **: p < 0.01; ***: p < 0.001.
Table 5
Difference in differences estimates: removal of multiple rewards for smoking.
Population achievement (N/P) Exception rate (E/P) Reported achievement (N/(P–E))
Recording smoking Cessation advice Recording smoking Cessation advice Recording smoking Cessation advice
(a) DIDs Control
δ1: 2006/7–2005/6 always multi −0.0269***
(0.0051)
−0.0316**
(0.0093)
−0.0020
(0.0030)
−0.0144
(0.0073)
−0.0313***
(0.0031)
−0.0487***
(0.0049)
δ2: 2007/8–2005/6 always multi −0.0258***
(0.0053)
−0.0328**
(0.0099)
−0.0019
(0.0030)
−0.0116
(0.0073)
−0.0302***
(0.0034)
−0.0477***
(0.0054)
δ1− γ1:
2006/7–2005/6
always single −0.0208**
(0.0062)
−0.0205
(0.0182)
−0.0094
(0.0052)
−0.0173
(0.0090)
−0.0315***
(0.0034)
−0.0404**
(0.0127)
δ2− γ2:
2007/8–2005/6
always single −0.0188*
(0.0065)
−0.0235
(0.0219)
−0.0124
(0.0062)
−0.0062
(0.0091)
−0.0324***
(0.0040)
−0.0322*
(0.0153)
(b) Change in DIDs
δ2 – δ1 always multi 0.0012
(0.0010)
−0.0012
(0.0021)
0.0001
(0.0009)
0.0028
(0.0018)
0.0012
(0.0006)
0.0009
(0.0012)
(δ2− γ2) – (δ1− γ1) always single 0.0020
(0.0023)
−0.0030
(0.0049)
−0.0030
(0.0019)
0.0111*
(0.0047)
−0.0009
(0.0016)
0.0081*
(0.0033)
n obs 22936 35140 22936 35140 22936 35140
Notes. Specification (2). Robust SEs clustered on indicators. *: p < 0.05; **: p < 0.01; ***: p < 0.001.
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advice changed little and there was no change in the total available
points for both activities. (Appendix A1 has a simple theory model
showing that even though the total points for the smoking indicators
were similar before and after the change, the switch to single from
multi-reward would have changed financial incentives to achieve the
indicators.) In 2005/6 the 12 smoking record and cessation advice in-
dicators have the same lower thresholds and nine had upper thresholds
of 90% and three of 70%. In 2006/7–2007/8 the single smoking record
and cessation indicators had a 40% lower threshold and 90% upper
threshold. Average reported achievement was comfortably above the
upper threshold for all indicators.
In Table 4 we compare the mean performance for the smoking and
non-smoking control indicators before and after the change in the
smoking indicators from multi to single reward. Population achieve-
ment, exception reporting, and reported achievement for the smoking
indicators were lower in 2006/7 and 2007/8 than in 2005/6, except for
population achievement in smoking status recording. Population
achievement, exception reporting, and reported achievement increased
for all the control groups of indicators. The unconditional DID are ne-
gative and statistically significant.
Table 5 has results from the DID specification (2). In panel (a) the
2006/7–2005/6 DIDs (δ1) and the 2007/8–2005/6 DIDs (δ2) for po-
pulation achievement (N/P) and reported achievement (N/(P−E)) are
negative and statistically significant for both recording and cessation
advice when the control group is always multi-reward indicators. When
the control group is always single indicators the DIDs (δt− γt) for po-
pulation achievement and reported achievement are generally less ne-
gative and are statistically insignificant in two of the eight DIDs. Ex-
ception rates for the smoking indicators were also reduced relative to
the other types but the changes are always statistically insignificant.
(Appendix A6 has similar results when 2006/7 to 2007/8 is used as a
single post change period.)
Panel (b) compares the 2006/7–2005/6 and 2007/8–2005/6 DIDs.
If the negative DIDs in panel (a) were due to an underlying downward
trend, not the change in incentives, then the 2007/8–2005/6 DIDs
would be more negative than the 2006/7–2005/6 DIDs: δ2 – δ1 < 0.
With the always multi-reward control group the change in the DIDs (δ2
– δ1) is never statistically significant and is positive in five of the six
cases. With the always single control group the change in the DIDs
(δ2− γ2) – (δ1− γ1) is statistically insignificant in four cases and in two
cases it statistically significant but positive: the 2007/8–2005/6 DID is
less negative than the 2006/7–2005/6 DID.
5. Conclusion
5.1. Study limitations
GPs are likely to be intrinsically as well as financially motivated. It
is therefore possible that some of the difference between achievement
on multi and single reward indicators found in the pooled panel ana-
lysis arises because GPs perceive multi-reward indicators as more
beneficial effect for patients. However, it seems unlikely that all of the
performance difference arises from intrinsic motivation. Our pooled
models include potential controls for effects on patients: type and
prevalence of the conditions to which indicators apply and whether the
indicators are for recording, treatment, or intermediate outcome.
Moreover, a recent study (Wilding et al., 2018) investigated the re-
moval of some indicators from the QOF in 2015/16, so that the activ-
ities covered by the indicators were no longer financially incentivised.
Although the health implications of the activities previously in-
centivised were unchanged, achievement fell for both multi and single
reward indicators, implying that GPs respond to financial incentives
even if this has negative health consequences for their patients.
This interpretation of the panel model results is supported by the
results from the DID models which avoid the problem of distinguishing
between intrinsic and financial motivation since they examine the effect
of a change from multi to single reward for a given set of activities
related to control of smoking. These models show that when smoking
indicators changed from multi to single reward in 2006/7 achievement
fell relative to control groups of indicator which were always single or
always multi rewarded. The DID design requires that in the absence of
the policy change the control and treatment groups would have had
parallel trends. Since there was data for only one pre-policy change year
2005/6 we could not apply conventional tests for parallel trends over
the pre-incentive change period. But we found that the 2007/8–2005/6
DIDs were either statistically indistinguishable from the 2006/7–2005/
6 DIDs or were less negative. This suggests that the reductions in
achievement for smoking indicators relative to the control indicators in
2006/7 and 2007/8 compared to 2005/6 were due to changes in in-
centives, not to pre-existing trends.
Both population and reported achievement for the two smoking
indicators were closer to the 100% maximum than the control in-
dicators. Thus their decline in achievement in 2006/7 and 2007/8 re-
lative to the controls might be due to a ceiling effect: it was possible for
achievement to increase for the controls but not the smoking indicators.
However, reported achievement for recording smoking and population
and reported achievement for smoking cessation advice fell in 2006/
7–2007/8 relative to 2005/6 so that their reduction relative to the
controls could not be due to the ceiling effect.
Our pooled and DID models are complementary: the pooled models
utilise data on all multi and single rewarded indicators over eight years
and the DID models examine the effect of changing from multi to single
reward for a single group of indicators but thereby controls for any
unobserved characteristics of indicators which might affect achieve-
ment.
We have practice, rather than patient, level data and so cannot di-
rectly compare the effects of single versus multiple rewards on in-
dividual patients, especially for multi-morbid patients. However, in
examining practice level outcomes we at least partially control for
practice level multi-morbidity by including prevalence rates for over 20
conditions, practice age and gender mix, and deprivation. Our admin-
istrative data has information on a large number of practices and we are
able to allow for practice characteristics (such as list size and GP
characteristics) and to attribute local small area socio-economic char-
acteristics to the practice list. Although patient level clinical datasets
are not panaceas, often being derived from a subset of possibly un-
representative practices and having sparse information on practice
characteristics and patient socio-economic characteristics, we plan in
future work to use patient level data to examine patient outcomes under
single and multi-reward indicators and the change in outcomes when
indicators change from multi to single reward.
5.2. Discussion
Comparing practice performance on all multi-reward and single
reward indicators between 2005/6 and 2012/13, we find, after al-
lowing for other characteristics of indicators and for practice char-
acteristics, that population achievement (N/P), which can be inter-
preted as a measure of quality, was 0.046 higher for multi-reward
indicators compared to the overall mean of 0.830. Exception reporting
(E/P) was lower for multi-reward indicators (by 0.026 compared to the
overall mean exception rate of 0.091). Reported achievement (N/
(P−E)), which determines practice revenue from the QOF, is higher for
multi-reward indicators (by 0.025 compared to the mean of 0.911 for
all indicators). The differences in population achievement, exception
reporting, and reported achievement between multiple and single re-
ward indicators were greater when the number of other indicators re-
warded for the same activity was greater.
Holding the disease prevalence (P) constant, increases in the
number of patients for whom an indicator is achieved (N) and increases
in the number exception reported (E) both increase reported achieve-
ment (N/(P−E)) and, if reported achievement is below the upper
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threshold, will increase practice revenue from the QOF. But we find that
multi reward increase population achievement (N/P) and reduces the
exception reporting rate (E/P). The explanation may be that GPs are
intrinsically as well as extrinsically motivated (McGuire, 2000;
Bénabou and Tirole, 2006). Increasing achievement on a quality in-
dicator benefits patients whereas gaming exception reporting does not
and offends against professional norms. If the incentives from multiple
rewards lead the practice to choose a high enough N to take reported
achievement above the upper threshold then the practice does not need
to increase E and could reduce it without financial penalty. Thus our
results are in line with Gravelle et al. (2010), who found that exception
reporting for an indicator was lower if the practice was above the upper
threshold in the previous year, and with Kontopantelis et al. (2012),
who found that exception reporting was increased after an increase in
the upper threshold if the practice was below the new threshold in the
year before the threshold increased.
For two activities (recording smoking status and providing smoking
cessation advice) population achievement and reported achievement
fell in 2006/7 when multi-reward indicators were replaced by single
reward indicators. Relative to indicators which were always multi-re-
ward, population achievement for smoking recording fell by 0.0264
compared to the 2005/6 mean of 0.9573 and for smoking cessation
advice it fell by 0.0322 compared to the 2005/6 mean of 0.9310. These
DID estimated effects of changing from multi to single reward for
smoking indicators are around half to one third smaller than the effect
implied by the pooled model comparing multi with single reward in-
dicators in general. They are, nevertheless, sizeable compared with
those induced by other changes to the QOF, such as changing upper
thresholds (Kontopantelis et al., 2012). The change from multi to single
reward for smoking indicators also reduced exception reporting, though
the effect was statistically insignificant and around half that suggested
by the pooled panel models using all indicators. The contrast in ex-
ception reporting results for the pooled panel models for all indicators
and the DID models for smoking may be because exception rates for
smoking indicators were only around one third of those for other in-
dicators.
The greater practice revenue from increased achievement for multi-
reward indicators compared to single reward indicators suggests in-
tuitively that achievement will be greater for multiple reward in-
dicators. But in the absence of very detailed information about the
extent of multi-morbidity, which will determine the effects on revenue,
and about the cost of increasing achievement, we could not test specific
hypotheses about individual indicators. Instead we have tested the
general hypothesis that GPs respond to the differences in incentives for
multiple reward indicators compared to single reward indicators. If we
had found no overall effect of multi-reward versus single reward this
might have been because there were offsetting positive and negative
effects across the individual indicators classified as multi or single re-
ward or it might be because GPs do not respond to the difference in
incentives. Our finding of overall higher population achievement and
reported achievement, and lower exception reporting, for multi reward
indicators is intuitively plausible and is evidence that GPs do respond to
the fine details of incentive schemes.
The QOF did not explicitly target multi-morbid patients but multiple
rewards for screening, monitoring, and treating patients increase in-
centives to improve quality for multi-morbid patients relative to those
with only one condition. The implicit incentives from multi-reward
indicators may thus have led to better outcomes for multi-morbid pa-
tients. The replacement of the multi-reward smoking indicators by
single reward indicators in 2006/7 may have disadvantaged multi-
morbid patients since after the change the additional revenue the
practice would earn for recording smoking status or offering smoking
cessation advice was the same for multi-morbid patients as for patients
with only one condition and achieving the indicator for multi-morbid
patients may be more costly for the practice.
The financial incentives for treating multi-morbid patients when
there are multi-reward indicators depend not just on the numbers of
multi-morbid patients but also on the numbers of singly morbid patients
with the same conditions. If multi-morbid patients have greater need
for good quality primary care (Salisbury et al., 2011) it would be better
to make the financial incentives for targeting them explicit and uniform
across practices, rather than implicit and accidental.
Our results have wider relevance for the general design of P4P
schemes. They show that decision-makers respond to the implicit in-
centives in P4P schemes, not just to the explicit links between measures
of performance and financial rewards. Such implicit incentives may not
be anticipated by P4P designers and can thus yield unintended con-
sequences. For example, other studies of the QOF have shown that
exception reporting, whose main purpose was to remove an incentive to
over treat patients, led some GPs to exception report patients in order to
boost their earnings from the QOF (Gravelle et al., 2010). Exception
reporting is an explicit and prominent feature of the QOF clinical in-
dicators. The implicit incentives created by multiple rewards for some
QOF indicators are less salient but they nevertheless affected GP be-
haviour and hence patient outcomes. Given that P4P schemes often
create complex multi-tasking incentives, the fact that decision makers
respond to fine details reinforces the case for P4P schemes to be subject
to simulations and trials to assess their effect on behaviour and out-
comes.
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